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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
MAY 1 4 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
RE: S t a t e v . Dunn Case No. 17571 
Dear Mr. B u t l e r , 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, I am writing to bring the Court's attention to supplemental 
authorities pertaining to questions asked during oral argument on 
the above referenced case. 
On page 35 of his Opening Brief, Mr. Dunn argued that his 
attorney at trial was ineffective for failing to request a 
compulsion instruction informing the jury that it was the State's 
burden to show that Mr. Dunn was not compelled and not Mr. Dunn's 
burden to prove the affirmative defense. During oral argument, 
the Court asked whether the law was clear, at the time of Mr. 
Dunn's trial in 1980, that such an instruction was necessary. 
Mr. Dunn wishes to direct the Court's attention to Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 
(1975), both of which prohibit jury instructions which might 
cause a jury to infer that some part of the burden of proof has 
been shifted to the defendant. Mr. Dunn also wishes to direct 
the Court's attention to United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879, 
883 (10th Cir. 1977) where the court ruled that in the case of 
affirmative defenses, a specific, clear jury instruction on the 
burden of proof is necessary. In Corrigan, the court reversed 
the defendant's conviction after concluding that the jury might 
have inferred that the burden of proving self-defense was on the 
defendant. 
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Geoffrey J. Butler 
May 14, 1991 
Page 2 
On page 7 of his Reply Brief, Mr. Dunn argued that the trial 
court's reversal of its decision to exclude Mr. Dunn's prior 
conviction, after Mr. Dunn had taken the witness stand, was 
prejudicial and a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. During oral argument, the Court asked 
whether counsel had found any cases in which an amendment or 
modification of a prior ruling had been held prejudicial. Mr. 
Dunn would like to direct the Court's attention to two United 
States Supreme Court cases; Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 
189 (1942) and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
In Johnson, the trial judge had incorrectly allowed the 
defendant to assert his privilege against self-incrimination and 
later allowed the prosecution to comment on the assertion of the 
privilege. The Court concluded that even though the judge could 
have denied the privilege thus making the prosecutor's comments 
proper, the defendant had relied on the erroneous ruling and 
therefore the judge should have disallowed the prosecutor's 
comments. 316 U.S. at 198-99. The Court did not reverse the 
conviction because although the defense attorney originally 
objected to the prosecutor's comments, that objection was with-
drawn and never renewed. 
In Doyle, the Court reversed a conviction where the prosecu-
tion had used the defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach the 
defendant on cross-examination. The Court ruled that the defen-
dant's silence might have been the result of reliance on the 
implication in the Miranda warning that there would be no penalty 
if the defendant chose to remain silent. 426 U.S. at 618-19. The 
dissent in Doyle characterized this argument as having "some of 
the characteristics of an estoppel theory." Id. at 620. 
Your attention to this matter is appreciated. 
Vepjf truly yours, 
r9r/W_ 
>ra Jy^Moore 
D J M : j m . -••>• , .... 
cc: Christine F. Soltis, Esq. 
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Mr. Geoffrey Butler 
Court Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Rose v. Allied Development Company 
Case No. 19488 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure/ please be advised that the case of Broussard v. Caci/ Inc./ 
121 L.R.R.M. 2282 (1st Cir. 1986) supports the contentions in 
defendant-respondent's brief at pages 8-14 and 30-33. 
Sincerely/ 
David A. Anderson 
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121 LRRM 2282 BROUSSARD v. CACI, INC. 
We find no persuasive evidence in 
either the plain words or legislative 
history of ERISA or the MPPAA that 
Congress intended section 515 to be an 
exception to the general rule of NLRB 
preemption for that narrow category 
of suits seeking recovery of unpaid 
contributions accrued during the peri-
od between contract expiration and 
impasse. Therefore, the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to Ad-
vanced must be affirmed. 
BROUSSARD v. CACI, INC. 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
First Circuit (Boston), 
BROUSSARD, et al. v. CACI, INC. 
— FEDERAL, et al.. No. 85-1648, Jan-
uary 2, 1986 
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
1. Wrongful discharge — General 
rule*178.510>172.07 
Contract of employment in Maine 
for indefinite length of time is termi-
nable at will by either party, unless 
parties clearly state their intention in 
express terms that discharge shall be 
only for "good cause." 
2. Wrongful discharge — 'Good-
cause' covenant •172.07 •170.510 
Employer's representations to dis-
charged employee that employee 
would have work through 1986, that it 
was hiring him for a career, and that 
employee would have long-term em-
ployment if he did a good job do not 
approach express undertaking to 
guarantee that employee could be dis-
charged only for "good cause." 
3. Wrongful discharge — Fraudu-
lent concealment •170.510 •170.65 
•172.0812 
Employee who was discharged for 
unsatisfactory performance before ex-
Advanced asserts that Impasse was reached, or. 
If not, that the unions waived their bargaining 
rights, thus permitting Advanced to make unilat-
eral changes in working conditions, but admits 
that the NLRB has never accepted this argument. 
Advanced suggests that since the duty to bargain 
in good faith created by §8(d) of the NLRA is 
mutual, a union that breaches this duty should 
not be permitted to complain about the employers 
unilateral changes in working conditions Deter-
mining the merits of this argument is initially a 
matter for the NLRB We, however, note that Ad-
vanced concededly made no payments after the 
day of expiration of the collective agreement. 
Since Advanced apparently breached 5§8(d) and 
8(aX5) before the unions can possibly have waived 
their rights, it seems unlikely that Advanced could 
successfully defend a properly documented unfair 
labor practice charge See Katz, 369 U S at 741-42. 
piration of his alleged three-year em-
ployment relationship failed to state 
claim for misrepresentation or fraudu-
lent concealment, where employer was 
under no affirmative duty to disclose 
that its policy was to discharge em-
ployees at will. 
Appeal from the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maine. Affirmed. 
William I. Cowin (Friedman & Ath-
erton, with him on brief), Boston, 
Mass., for appellants. 
George Z. Singal (Gross, Minsky, 
Mogul & Singal, P.A., and Micheal S. 
Friedman, Jeffery P. Elefante, Virgin-
ia G. Watkin, Douglas S. Abel and 
Covington & Burling with him on 
brief), Bangor, Maine, for appellees. 
Before COFFIN and BREYER, Cir-
cuit Judges, and WYZANSKI,* Sen-
ior District Judge. 
Full Text of Opinion 
COFFIN, Circuit Judge: — This is a 
case of parties entering into a relation-
ship with unarticulated and contra-
dictory assumptions resulting in frus-
trated expectations. This is also a case 
which, though terminating in a sum-
mary judgment for defendants, has 
been anything but summary in the 
quantity of counts pleaded, deposi-
tions, affidavits, exhibits, and layers of 
judicial attention. Accordingly, we 
shall be brief in indicating the reasons 
for our affirmance on the judgment 
below. 
The breach of contract count (Count 
I) began as an allegation that plaintiff 
was fired in violation of defendant CA-
CI's personnel policies, that he was not 
given a minimum of three years em-
ployment as promised, and that his 
discharge was in breach of an implied 
covenant of fair dealing. This set of 
claims has metamorphosed into a 
present claim that "the parties entered 
into an indefinite employment ar-
rangement subject to an understand-
ing that Broussard would not be ter-
minated arbi trar i ly / ' (Appellant's 
brief, p. 17) 
[1J Under Maine law, "a contract of 
employment for an indefinite length of 
time is terminable at will by either 
party", Terrio v. Millinocket Commu-
nity Hospital, 379 A.2d 135, 137, 115 
LRRM 4358 (Me. 1977) (emphasis in 
original), unless the parties "clearly 
stat(el their intention" in "express 
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by 
designation. 
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terms*' that a discharge shall be only 
for good cause. Larrabee v. Penobscot 
Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97, 99-100, 118 
LRRM 2489 (Me. 1984). In the latter 
case the court made clear that a prom-
ise, merely implied, not to fire without 
good cause, was inadequate. Id. at 99. 
[2J In this case the representations 
made to plaintiff by CACI — to the 
effect that CACI would have work in 
Bath "roughly through 1986", that it 
was "hiring him for a career . . . n o t . . . 
under the body shop technique", that 
"there was Isic] no restraints on what 
he could or could not do professionally 
and financially with CACI", and that 
"if he did a good job he would have 
long-term employment" — do not ap-
proach an express undertaking to 
guarantee that plaintiff could be dis-
charged only for good cause. In the 
euphoria of initial negotiations, plain-
tiff's expectations of tenure may well 
have been reinforced by these repre-
sentations, but his expectations could 
not be held to have been created by 
these representations. 
The difference between puffery and 
promise is preserved by the Maine 
cases we have cited. Employment ne-
gotiations resulting in employment 
are by definition conducted in an at-
mosphere of optimism and mutual 
hope. The air is redolent with expecta-
tion of duration on the part of the 
employee and of satisfactory perform-
ance by the employer. But to equate 
general expressions of hope for a long 
relationship with an express promise 
to discharge only for good cause would 
effectively eliminate Maine's rule, se-
vere though it may be, that contracts 
for indefinite employment are, with-
out more, terminable at will.' 
So concluding, we need not address 
the questions whether the undertak-
ing was unenforceable under the Stat-
ute of Frauds or whether such a de-
fense was precluded by equitable 
estoppel. Our silence on these issues, 
however, does not imply any disagree-
ment with the district court. [3] The count alleging misrepresen-
tation (Count II) also underwent a per-
' According to the author of the note, Protect-
ing At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge 
The Duty to Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 1816 (1980). two-thirds of the Ameri-
can work force is governed by this rule. Id. at 1816. 
Under it, "lejven when an employee has reasonable 
grounds for expecting that some degree of job se-
curity was part of the deal, the at will rule often 
operates to frustrate her expectations." Id. at 1818. 
Further. "Icjourts have generally been reluctant to 
interfere with the parties' 'freedom to contract'; if 
an employee fails to bargain for an express con-
tractual protection against wrongful discharge, 
the court will not intervene whether the contract 
was terminated 'for good cause, for no cause or 
even for cause morally wrong.' " Id at 1818-19. 
mutation, beginning with the allega-
tion that CACI falsely represented 
that it would have work for plaintiff in 
Bath, Maine, for at least three years, 
and ending with the claim that CACI 
"failed to inform Broussard of the ele-
ment which could render all the other 
representations meaningless — i.e., 
that he could be arbitrarily terminat-
ed without recourse " (Appellants' 
brief, p. 24) 
The sum total of the testimony relied 
on to create a genuine issue of misrep-
resentation, extracted from a 300-page 
appendix which in turn was distilled 
from many more hundreds of pages of 
depositions and affidavits, consists of 
the following statements: CACI's poli-
cy was "plant a garden and then weed 
it and all the cream surfaces to 
the top"; "All it takes to remove some 
. . . is if his boss wants to and his boss' 
boss agrees to it"; and if customers did 
not like CACFs employees who dealt 
with them, they — the customers — 
would have influence in effecting their 
discharge. 
The issue is whether failure to reveal 
these details of CACI's discharge at 
will policy is actionable as a half-
truth, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§529 (1977); or a fraudulent conceal-
ment, id., §550; Atwood v. Chapman, 68 
Me. 38 (1877); cf. Horner v. Flynn, 334 
A.2d 194 (Me. 1975). 
The district court distinguished 
Wildes v. Pens Unlimited Co., 389 A.2d 
837 (Me. 1978), where a putative em-
ployer was held liable for concealing 
from a salesman being hired the fact 
that a reorganization of the company 
which would eliminate the salesman's 
position was then under way. The dis-
trict court noted the absence of any 
plan to eliminate plaintiff's position 
and concluded that "[tjo accept the 
plaintiffs' argument of a duty to dis-
close here would require that every 
employer who hires at will affirma-
tively state its right to terminate arbi-
trarily." 
We do not say that there may not be 
extreme situations where the record of 
arbitrary and irresponsible firing is so 
egregious that failure to disclose it 
would constitute fraudulent conceal-
ment. But there is no such record here. 
Plaintiff's predecessor was discharged 
not on a superior's whim but for unsa-
tisfactory performance after several 
trips by CACI officials had been made 
to Bath to try to help him. And for 
CACI, a consulting company depend-
ent on the good will of the government 
agencies it serves, to be sensitive to 
customer complaints is not surpris-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ing.J At worst the nondisclosure in 
this record is that of a policy hospita-
ble to firing on the complaint of a 
customer, cushioned against the whim 
of one person by the requirement that 
two supervisors join in the action. In 
other words, the policy is that of dis-
charge at will, taken seriously. 
The problem is that, if the nondis-
closure described here is held to raise a 
genuine issue of fraudulent conceal-
ment, this would be an open-ended in-
vitation to litigation of the issue in 
almost every case of a discharge at 
will. We would not know how to draw a 
line between failure to state the law of 
at will discharges — which would not 
be actionable — and failure to state 
how a company applies this law — 
which would be actionable. We there-
fore hold that the statements we have 
cited do not constitute sufficiently 
substantial evidence to create a "genu-
ine" issue of material fact. Hahn v. 
Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir. 
1975). 
We affirm the judgments on both 
Counts I and II and, accordingly, do 
not reach Counts VI and VII, claiming 
negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress and seeking punitive damages. 
Affirmed. 
DONOVAN v. ROSE LAW FIRM 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit (St. Louis) 
DONOVAN, etc. v. THE ROSE LAW 
FIRM, No. 84-1863-EA, December 27, 
1985 
On petition for rehearing and re-
hearing en banc of 119 LRRM 3345. 
Denied. 
Full Text of Order 
Appellee's petition for rehearing en 
banc has been considered by the Court 
and is denied. 
Judges Donald P. Lay, Gerald W. 
Heaney, Theodore McMillian and 
George G. Fagg would have granted 
the petition. 
Petition for rehearing by the panel is 
also denied. 
5
 The record in the instant case contains exten-
sive deposition testimony that at a minimum the 
following persons were disturbed by the newspaper 
article based on plaintiff's interview that caused 
his firing: a Navy Captain, three Navy Command-
ers, and six Navy civil servants. 
CENTRAL HARDWARE v. 
CENTRAL STATES 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Eithth Circuit (St. Louis) 
CENTRAL HARDWARE COM-
PANY, etc. v. CENTRAL STATES 
SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION 
FUND, et al., Nos. 84-2158 and 84-2297, 
November 8, 1985 
On petition for rehearing and re-
hearing en banc of 120 LRRM 3029, 
770 F.2d 106. Denied. 
Full Text of Order 
Petition for rehearing en banc filed 
by Central Hardware Company, has 
been considered by the Court and is 
denied. 
Judges Donald R. Ross and Pasco M. 
Bowman would have granted the peti-
tion. 
Petition for rehearing by the panel is 
also denied. 
ABRAMOVICH v. PA. LIQUOR 
CONTROL BOARD 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
ABRAMOVICH, individually and 
trading as ABRAMS STORAGE 
COMPANY v. COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVA-
NIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD, 
No. 556 D.C. 1984, December 28, 1984 
CONTRACTS 
Collective bargaining — State liquor 
board — Adjustment of rates •24.55 
•114.22 
Storage company, which was award-
ed contract with state liquor control 
board to store, handle, and transport 
liquor and other supplies, was not re-
quired to enter into collective bargain-
ing contracts with unions whose mem-
bers worked for company that 
previously held liquor contract, and 
therefore provision in liquor contract 
on "mandatory requirement" of 
change in rate of payment for labor 
did not entitle storage company to 
readjustment of contractual rate of 
payment to cover increased labor costs 
under union contracts. Company had 
other options available to it, including 
filing unfair labor practice charge 
with NLRB or petitioning federal dis-
trict court for appropriate injunctive 
relief. 
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MAY 2 11991 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court CLERK SUPREME COURT 
Utah Supreme Court IP"AM ' 
332 State Capitol " 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Rej State v. Dunn. Case No. 17571 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
During appellant's final oral argument, the Court asked 
which party had requested a lesser included instruction on 
reckless manslaughter to be given or if defendant had objected to 
the giving of such an instruction. I would direct the Court's 
attention to the record at T. 527-528 and the supplemental record 
of defendant's requested jury instructions, specifically 
requested instructions 4, 10, 26, and the requested verdict form. 
In response to appellant's letter of May 14th, the 
state would ask that the letter be stricken as not in conformity 
with rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or in the 
alternative, to recognize the letter as a request for 
supplemental briefing. 
Sincerely, 
'^Ok^hyJ^oU^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CFS/jn 
cc: Debra J. Moore, Esq. 
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